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THE ANTI-FEDERALIST NINTH AMENDMENT
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CALVIN R. MASSEY*
The ninth amendment has, of late, been the focus of much academic re-
flection. In this Article, Professor Massey provides a provocative thesis regarding
the intended purposes and uses of the ninth amendment. Professor Massey con-
tends that the amendment is one of substance, guaranteeing the existence of
citizens' rights, both created and preserved in state constitutions.
Although in recent years the ninth amendment' has become the
topic of considerable academic commentary,2 for the most part courts
have ignored the amendment as a source of substantive constitutional
rights.3 This general lack of attention, however, has been distinguished
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings. I express my ap-
preciation to the National Association of Attorneys General, at whose annual seminar on
state constitutional law I delivered a preliminary version of these thoughts. I am also grateful
to my perceptive colleague, Bill Wang. Of course, the errors and omissions are all mine.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IX: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,
shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people."
2. Among the recent commentary is an entire symposium issue of the Chicago[-]
Kent Law Review, Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI[-]KENT L. REv.
37 (1988); an anthology of leading articles on the ninth amendment, THE RIGHTS RETAINED
BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (R. Barnett ed.
1989) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS RETAINED]; two books, M. GOODMAN, THE NINTH AMEND-
MENT (1981), and C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAw (1981); portions of another
book, J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-41 (1980);
and the following articles: Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
1 (1988); Massey, Federalism and FundamentalRights: The Ninth Amendment, 38 HASTINGS
L.J. 305 (1987); Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment's
Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63 (1987); Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth
Amendment, 69 VA. L. REV. 223 (1983); Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L.
REV. 1 (1980). Older but quite useful contributions include B. PATTERSON, THE FORGOTTEN
NINTH AMENDMENT (1955); Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L.
REV. 1 (1968); Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 814 (1966); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights... Retained by the People?", 37 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 787 (1962); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 787 (1959); Dunbar,
James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. REV. 627 (1956). For a useful bibli-
ography of ninth amendment scholarship, see THE RIGHTS RETAINED, supra.
3. Judicial use of the ninth amendment is summarized in Redlich, Ninth Amend-
ment, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1316-20 (L. Levy ed.
1986). Prior to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), only seven cases dealt with
the ninth amendment in any meaningful fashion: Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 492-
93 (1957); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144 (1948); United Pub. Workers
of Amer. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 94-95 (1947); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306
U.S. 118, 143-44 (1939); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936); Scott v. Sandford,
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by notable exceptions. Perhaps the most famous judicial invocation of
the ninth amendment was Justice Goldberg's concurrence in Griswold
v. Connecticut,4 where he advanced the ninth amendment as a possible
textual home for the otherwise constitutionally unexpressed right to
privacy. Even Warren Burger, a notably cautious justice, relied on the
ninth amendment in upholding a right of press access to criminal trials
in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.5
It would thus be imprudent to dismiss the amendment as devoid
of practical constitutional significance. Moreover, from an academic
perspective, it would be rash indeed to pass over such a rich and rel-
atively unmined vein of constitutional ore. Accordingly, in this Article
I present a provocative thesis designed to stretch the legal imagination
concerning the intended purposes and contemporary uses of the ninth
amendment.
6
Two fundamental propositions may be made about the ninth
amendment. First, it embodies a deep belief held by the founders that
individuals composing a political society cede to government only a
limited, enumerated portion of their freedoms; all other individual
rights are inviolate. This proposition demands our allegiance to the
principle-plain in the text of the ninth amendment-that unenumer-
ated constitutional rights are entitled to the same constitutional pro-
tection as enumerated rights. This is so because if the reserved rights
are not to be denied or disparaged by the enumeration of other rights,
but only the enumerated rights are susceptible to meaningful protection,
the reserved rights must necessarily wither away. This understanding,
in turn, commits us to locate those rights outside the constitution itself.
Yet, because this principle rests on the premise that governments pos-
sess legitimate power to invade only those individual freedoms ceded
by the act of political union, a corollary belief attends that there is a
domain of private choice with which government may not legitimately
interfere. If this is so, it follows that the unenumerated rights intended
as sacrosanct are of necessity "negative" ones: rights that inhere in
individuals to negate government actions that seek to invade the in-
dividual sphere. While it is true that no single theory of political union
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 511 (1857) (Campbell, J., concurring); Lessee of Livingston v. Moore,
32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 469, 551 (1833) (in which the reference to the "ninth article of amendment"
may refer to the ninth proposed amendment, which was eventually the seventh amendment
adopted).
4. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. 448 U.S. 555, 579 n.15 (1980).
6. For an earlier and even more tentative version of this thesis, see Massey,
Antifederalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 CHI.[-]KENT L. REv. 987 (1988). See also
Bonventre, Beyond the Reemergence-'Inverse Incorporation' and Other Prospects for State
Constitutional Law, 53 ALBANY L. REV. 403, 415-18 (1989).
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was universally accepted in late eighteenth-century America,7 it is also
true that Americans were virtually united in their desire to free indi-
viduals from oppressive state control. The Hobbesian ideal of an om-
nipotent state was decisively rejected; if Americans were not orthodox
Lockeans, they were at least, in today's parlance, highly libertarian. The
ninth amendment is the fruit of that attitude.
A second and more controversial proposition is that the ninth
amendment is part of an "Anti-Federalist constitution," one concerned
with preserving the states as autonomous units of government and as
structural bulwarks of human liberty. According to this view, the ninth
amendment is both historically and structurally part of a constitutional
antidote to the potential excesses of national power so feared by the
Anti-Federalists.8 Although the Federalists opposed a bill of rights on
the ground that an imperfect, or incomplete, enumeration of rights
would effectively presume that all other rights had been abandoned to
government, 9 and James Madison (in his Federalist phase) was the
principal architect of the amendment,10 it is too facile to regard the
ninth amendment as a Federalist monument. The amendment, like the
rest of the Bill of Rights, was in essence a device to ensure that the
national government would be disabled from intruding upon the fun-
damental rights of its citizenry. I It accomplishes this by endeavoring
7. See, e.g., F. McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL
ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) (contending that the founding generation subscribed
to both multiple and contradictory political philosophies).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 17-67.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 48-49.
11. I endorse the view that the ninth amendment acts as an independent constraint
on governmental power. This view has been labeled by Randy Barnett as the "power-con-
straint" conception. Barnett, supra note 2, at 11, 26-42; see also Massey, supra note 2, at
329-44. The opposing view is that if the ninth amendment has any substance at all, it merely
replicates the function of the tenth amendment by stating, in essence, that individual con-
stitutional rights and powers delegated to the central government are complementary: as
powers are exercised, rights decrease; as powers shrink, rights inflate. Barnett labels this view
the "rights-powers" conception. Barnett, supra note 2, at 4-9. Thomas McAffee has recently
argued that the ninth amendment was originally intended only to constrain the powers of
the federal government by preventing the inference that an enumeration of rights implied a
general augmented federal power to invade unenumerated ones, while the tenth amendment
was intended to ensure that the states continued to possess powers not surrendered in the
plan of the 1787 Constitution. See McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment,
90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990). McAffee's historical argument is open to debate, but his
more fundamental error is in supposing that, even assuming he has read history accurately,
the original intentions now control. McAffee contends that the ninth amendment's function
was only to cabin federal powers and not to establish "legally enforceable, affirmatively defined
limitations on governmental power on behalf of individual claimants." Id. at 1222. However,
like Pandora's Box, federal powers have since been virtually released from whatever re-
straining check was supplied by enumeration in the Constitution. Thus, for the ninth amend-
ment to perform the original structural function claimed by McAffee, it is essential that the
amendment act as an affirmative limit on governmental powers now virtually freed from the
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to preserve both natural rights (those transcendent of political union)
and rights located in state law (created or preserved by the people in
the act of state political union).
12
I will not pursue in this Article the argument that the ninth amend-
ment is a source ofjudicially enforceable natural rights. It is enormously
difficult to define natural rights in a sufficiently precise, bounded or
even temporal fashion to permit principled judicial enforcement. 13
Instead, I contend, in the company of even those most skeptical that
the ninth amendment has substance, that the amendment was intended
to guarantee the existence of rights created or preserved in state con-
stitutions. 
14
The ninth amendment explicitly commands that unenumerated
rights are not to be denied or disparaged by virtue of their lack of
textual location in the federal Constitution. The very term "disparage"
carries with it a strong implication that enumerated and unenumerated
constitutional rights are to be accorded equal status. "Disparage" has
its origins in the Old French term deparager, meaning "to marry un-
equally."'  Its more modem, English meaning is "actions or words"
that "depreciate, undervalue" or "degrade" that which is disparaged. 16
Thus, whether by reference to its etymological roots or its contemporary
meaning, the concept of disparagement has at its heart the denial of
equal treatment, or parity, between the items compared. If both enum-
erated and unenumerated rights are entitled to the full panoply of con-
stitutional protections accorded individual liberties, and if the ninth
amendment was intended to preserve individual liberties secured by
state constitutions, the necessary conclusion is that individual liberties
secured by state constitutions against governmental invasion were fed-
eralized by the ninth amendment. Just as the fifth amendment prevents
Congress from using its delegated powers to compel a criminal de-
fendant to testify against herself, the ninth amendment prevents Con-
gress from using its delegated powers to contravene an unenumerated
original limits to those powers envisioned by the framers. See also infra text accompanying
notes 59-86, and Massey, supra note 2, at 312-23.
12. For elaboration on these points, see Massey, supra note 2, at 312-23.
13. It is certainly not impossible, however. For a promising methodology for lo-
cating such natural rights, see Barnett, supra note 2, at 30-38.
14. A caveat is now in order. Henceforth, when I refer to ninth amendment rights,
unless specifically made clear to the contrary, I am referring only to that strand of ninth
amendment rights I have identified as "positive" or "civil" rights. My conclusions here would
not necessarily be identical with respect to the natural law strand of ninth amendment rights.
In a future article I hope to provide further refinements pertaining to the natural law aspects
of the ninth amendment. Currently, the best developed effort to construct a usable and
principled method of locating natural law rights protected by the ninth amendment may be
found in Barnett, supra note 2, at 26-42. See also Massey, supra note 2, at 329-44.
15. WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
750 (2d ed. 1944).
16. Id.
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federal right contained within a state constitution. Thus, state citizens
have the power, through their state constitutions, to preserve areas of
individual life from invasion by the federal Congress in the exercise of
its delegated powers'
This is radical stuff, for it amounts to a form of reverse preemption.
Lest it be dismissed too quickly, this Article first examines the historical
pedigree of the argument, considering the Anti-Federalists' demands
for a bill of rights, the Federalists' response to those demands and other
readings of historical sources. In section II, this Article examines some
contemporary applications of the theory and discusses problems it
poses. This discussion leads to the conclusion that, for the theory to
be workable, the judiciary will need to devise a test enabling it to
recognize only those ninth amendment positive rights that preserve
fundamental liberties without impeding the legitimate exercise of na-
tional power to accomplish national policy. Section III proposes and
defends such a test.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURE OF
NINTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
A. The Ninth Amendment as a Font of Unenumerated Rights
It is familiar history that the 1789 convention took place amid a
crisis of confidence in the new nation.' 7 Most, but by no means all, of
the leaders of the time thought that the difficulties of trade, public debt
and funding of a national government for common purposes such as
defense demanded a significantly stronger central government. II Par-
ticipants of the Philadelphia convention were more commonly beset
by fears of state encroachment upon national power than fears of federal
displacement of state power. In part, this was due to the Confederation
experience, marked by state jealousies, rival tariffs, artificial barriers to
trade and the lack of a national currency or credit;' 9 in part, it was due
17. See generally G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-
1787, at 393-429 (1969); F. McDONALD, supra note 7, at 143-83 (1985); R. MORRIS, WITNESSES
AT THE CREATION 120-78 (1985).
18. See H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 24-32 (1981), for
a most thoughtful survey of the Anti-Federalists' view of the need for a stronger central
government. Storing argues that the Anti-Federalists were divided on this point, but even
those who accepted the need for a stronger central government did so only with respect to
limited purposes, such as national defense.
19. "The financial condition was chaos," claims historian Albert Beveridge. 1 A.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 295 (1916). Each state issued its own paper
currency, which was virtually worthless and unacceptable outside the state of issuance. In-
terstate commerce was predictably stifled by the lack of a common currency. States commonly
imposed tariffs on goods imported into the state regardless of their origin in some other
American state. See generally id. at 295-311.
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to sheer intellectual fascination with Madison's pathbreaking concep-
tion of the "extended republic" as a device to check the ever-present
dangers of majoritarianism.2 ° Madison contended that a large, diverse
nation could control factionalism by bringing diverse factions under a
common roof, making it harder for any particular group to dominate
the majoritarian machinery.2'
While the framers relied heavily on Madison's view, they also
resorted to other devices to ensure the continuation of human liberty.
In designing the structure of the central government, they took care
both to disperse power among the branches of government and to insert
the powers of each branch into the other branches in a fashion we call
"checks and balances." In defending the constitutional design, Madison
argued that the "accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands ... may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny. ' 22 This principle "did not mean that these de-
partments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the
acts of each other .... [but rather] that where the whole power of one
department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole
power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free con-
stitution are subverted."' 23 Madison thought that simply marking "with
precision, the boundaries of these departments" 24 provided wholly in-
sufficient "parchment barriers against the encroaching spirit of
power." 25 Instead, "the great security against a gradual concentration
of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those
who administer each department the necessary constitutional means
and personal motives to resist encroachment of the others."'26
20. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison explored the problems associated with con-
trolling self-interested factions which, when constituting a majority of the polity, threaten
"to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
citizens." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 80 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary ed. 1966).
Madison argued that in small communities, the dangers of factionalization were heightened
because "[a] common passion or interest will ... be felt by a majority of the whole ...
[leaving] nothing to check the inducements to sacrifice the [minority]." Id. at 81. But, in a
large, diverse community-the "extended republic"-the dangers of faction will be diminished
by reason of the "greater variety of parties and interests ... [which] make it less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens."
Id. at 83.
21. See generally id. Madison's view was in stark contrast to that of Baron de
Montesquieu, who believed that republics could only survive in small, homogeneous societies.
See Montesquieu, 8 THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 124 (A. Cohler, B. Miller & H. Stone trans.
& eds. 1989).
22. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 301 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary eds. 1966).
23. Id. at 302-03 (emphasis in original).
24. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 308 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary eds.
1966).
25. Id.
26. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 321-22 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary eds.
1966).
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Of equal importance was the preservation of states' independent
status. Madison contended that an advantage of the new Constitution
was that "the federal and State governments ... [would possess] the
disposition and the faculty ... to resist and frustrate the measures of
each other."27 This was thought necessary in order to curb "ambitious
encroachments of the federal government on the authority of the State
governments."28 Moreover, the framers acknowledged that the federal
government would depend upon the states for its very existence,
through such devices as state control over the qualifications of voters,
the election of senators by state legislatures and the use of the electoral
college or voting by states within the House of Representatives to elect
the president. 29 To facilitate the independence of the states, the framers
vested the central government with "few and defined" powers, reserving
to the states "all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people."
30
Thus, the expectation of the framers was "that the protection of
citizen rights was a matter to be governed by state constitutional law";
31
in other words, sovereignty rested ultimately with the people of each
state. A "federal republic ... of both national and state governments
was possible because the people, as the sovereign body, were superior
to each government and could determine the precise amount of power
allocated to each."' 32 Therefore, in Federalist No. 46, Madison could
declare with confidence that the federal and state governments were
"different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with different
powers, and designed for different purposes.1 33 Accordingly, to Mad-
ison and the Federalists there was no need for an enumerated bill of
rights, because the sovereign people had made an explicit, and quite
narrow, delegation of power to the central government in the new Con-
stitution.
The Anti-Federalists, however, had good reason to think other-
wise. At the Philadelphia Convention, George Mason made the irre-
futable observation that the supremacy clause would render all federal
laws "paramount to State Bills of Rights." 34 Although Mason and El-
27. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 295 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary eds.
1966).
28. Id. at 298.
29. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 45, at 291 (J. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary
eds. 1966).
30. Id. at 292-93.
31. Wilmarth, The Original Purpose of the Bill of Rights: James Madison and the
Founders' Search for a Workable Balance Between Federal and State Power, 26 AM. CluM.
L. REV. 1261, 1272 (1989).
32. Id. at 1273.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 27, at 294.
34. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 588 (M. Farrand
ed. 1966) (George Mason speech of Sept. 12, 1787).
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bridge Gerry were unsuccessful in their attempt to persuade the Phil-
adelphia Convention to attach a bill of rights to the proposed Consti-
tution, the lack of a bill of rights became "the chief rallying point for
the opponents to the Constitution during the ratification debates."
35
The Anti-Federalists' central objection to the new Constitution was
that it "would create an oppressive national government and destroy
the political authority of the states." 36 Evidence of this was found in
the consolidated nature of the new central government, a government
with sweeping legislative and judicial powers and the authority to make
its legislation supreme-displacing any contrary state statutory or con-
stitutional law. Because the practical necessity of a stronger central
government was apparent, the Anti-Federalist opposition shifted "to a
reluctant acceptance of the instrument provided that appropriate con-
stitutional restraints were placed upon the powers of the federal gov-
ernment." 37 To Mason, appropriate restraints would be those that
would "point out what powers were reserved to the state governments,
and clearly discriminate between [such powers] and those which are
given to the general government." 38 Accordingly, every one of the eight
states whose ratification conventions proposed amendments to the
Constitution included an amendment reserving to the states all unen-
umerated rights and powers.
39
Federalists reacted to these demands by asserting that "any enu-
meration of rights would necessarily be imperfect and would create the
inference that no rights existed except those itemized."40 Thus, it was
preferable to enumerate imperfectly "the powers of the federal govern-
ment with the implication that powers not enumerated were reserved
to the people, than to attempt an imperfect enumeration of rights re-
served to the people, with the implication that rights not so reserved
were impliedly delegated to the federal government.
41
35. Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 1276; see also H. STORING, supra note 18, at 15-
23 (discussing the Anti-Federalist "belief that there was an inherent connection between the
states and the preservation of individual liberty ... [since] states ... are the natural homes
of individual liberty," id. at 15).
36. Wilmarth, supra note 31 at 1276; see also H. STORING, supra note 18, at 64-
70 ("the legacy of the Anti-Federalists was the Bill of Rights," id. at 65).
37. Wilmarth, supra note 31 at 1276; see also H. STORING, supra note 18, at 24-
37 (discussing the qualified acceptance by the Anti-Federalists of a stronger central govern-
ment).
38. 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 271 (J. Elliot ed. 1836) (George Mason speech of June 11, 1788
at the Virginia convention) [hereinafter DEBATES]; 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY 793 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971) [hereinafter 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS].
39. See 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 665-66 (Pennsylvania), 712
(Massachusetts), 732 (Maryland), 757 (South Carolina), 760 (New Hampshire), 842 (Virginia),
911-12 (New York), 968 (North Carolina).
40. Massey, supra note 2, at 309.
41. Id. See also Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 1285.
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The Anti-Federalists' response was that the enumeration of federal
government powers was unbounded. For support, they pointed to nu-
merous factors: the existence of the "general welfare" 4 2 and "necessary
and proper" 4 3 clauses in the Constitution; the fact that the Federalists
had already enumerated certain rights such as the right to jury trial in
criminal cases," the right to habeas corpus45 and the prohibition of
bills of attainder and ex post facto laws;46 and their reservations over
whether an incomplete enumeration of rights could be overcome by a
declaration that "all rights are reserved ... which are not expressly
surrendered."47
The ninth amendment finds its textual origins in this last point.
Once Madison began the task of shepherding a bill of rights through
the first Congress, he proposed that the enumeration of specific rights
in the Constitution "shall not be construed as to diminish the just
importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the
powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual limitations
of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution. '48 In ex-
plaining this proposal on the floor of the House of Representatives,
Madison declared that the "amendment [would] prevent the implied
surrender of unenumerated rights 'into the hands of the General Gov-
ernment,' or any implied 'enlarge[ment of] the powers delegated by the
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
43. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
44. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
46. Id.
47. 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 324 (H. Storing ed. 1981) (Letter XVI of
"The Federal Farmer").
48. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (J. Gales & W. Seaton ed. 1834) (remarks of James
Madison on June 8, 1789); 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 1027. To Professor
McAffee, Madison's "draft proposal provides strong additional confirmation that the Fed-
eralists were concerned that a bill of rights would undercut the scheme of limited powers
and be read to imply contructive powers not intended by the constitutional design." McAffee,
supra note 11, at 1284. McAffee is correct, but only partially so, for he rejects the possibility
that Madison intended the ninth amendment to perform two different functions simulta-
neaously: prevention of implied constructive governmental powers and recognition of ju-
dicially enforceable individual unenumerated rights. Id. at 1293-1303. McAffee argues that
arguments supportive of the latter function are "inconsistent with what we know of Madison's
role in the Bill of Rights debate." Id. at 1300. In fact, the arguments are inconsistent only if
one makes an initial assumption that Madison could not have intended the ninth amendment
to perform two different functions simultaneously. But Madison left clear evidence that he
recognized that human liberty could be better secured both by limitations on governmental
powers and by recognition of judicially enforceable affirmative rights. In proposing to Con-
gress that the Bill of Rights be adopted, Madison asserted that the 1787 Constitution was
defective in that "it did not contain effectual provisions against the encroachment on par-
ticular rights." 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra at 433. The Bill of Rights-judicially enforceable
affirmative rights-was Madison's proposed remedy to this defect. It is thus most plausible
that Madison intended the ninth amendment to serve both functions, regardless of whatever
theoretical awkwardness might be produced by such a dual role.
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constitution'" to the national government.4 9 To Arthur Wilmarth this
sufficiently proves "that the ninth amendment was originally intended
to allow the people of each state to define unenumerated rights under
their own constitution and laws, free from federal interference."
50
This view is bolstered by the evident connection between the ninth
and tenth amendments. 51 Anti-Federalist objections to the Constitution
centered on the lack of restraints upon federal power, specifically, the
need for a textual directive that all powers and rights not surrendered
to the national government remained with the states and their people.
Accordingly, the first proposed amendments were worded in a fashion
encompassing the thoughts later contained in the ninth and tenth
amendments. During the Bill of Rights ratification debates, Virginia
delegate Hardin Burnley informed Madison by letter that Edmund Ran-
dolph had professed displeasure with the ninth amendment because
"there was no criterion by which it could be determined whether any
particular [unenumerated] right was retained or not."5 2 Thus, to Ran-
dolph, it was preferable "that this reservation against constructive
power, should operate rather as a provision against extending the pow-
ers of Congress by their own authority, than as a reservation of rights
reducible to no definitive certainty."
53
To many contemporary observers, including Madison, Randolph's
49. Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 1297.
50. Id. at 1297-98. Even those who contend that the ninth amendment lacks any
ascertainable substantive content admit that its original purpose was to preserve state con-
stitutional, statutory and common law rights from elimination, simply by virtue of the implied
consequence of the adoption of the Constitution. For example, Russell Caplan concluded
that "the ninth amendment embraces those individual liberties protected by state laws."
Caplan, supra note 2, at 265. Raoul Berger contends that the ninth amendment "was designed
to limit federal powers ... [by preventing) any exercise of power which may endanger the
states...." Berger, The Ninth Amendment: The Beckoning Mirage, 42 RUTGERS L. REV.
951, 956 (1990). Berger concludes that with the ninth amendment, "the people looked to the
states, not the federal newcomer, to protect their rights .... [T]he ninth amendment was to
limit, not to enlarge, federal power." Id. at 980-81. Even Judge Robert Bork, certainly no
friend of unenumerated constitutional rights, opined at his confirmation hearings that "I
think the ninth amendment says that, like powers, the enumeration of rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage rights retained by the people in their State Constitutions. That
is the best I can do with it" (emphasis added). The Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearings before the Comm. on
the Judiciary, United States Senate, 100th Cong., 1 st Sess. 249 (1988) [hereinafter Bork Hear-
ings]. At another point, Judge Bork reiterated this point when he observed "it is a little hard
to know what category of rights, if any, were supposed to be preserved by the ninth amendment
unless it is the State constitutional rights." Id. at 290.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people."
52. 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 1188 (letter from Hardin Burnley to
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conception that the retention of unenumerated rights was equivalent
only to a denial of implied congressional power made no sense. Mad-
ison termed it "fanciful" and argued that for either tack to be effective,
both must have real teeth. In writing to George Washington, Madison
observed: "[i]f a line can be drawn between the powers granted and
the rights retained, it would seem to be the same thing, whether the
latter be secured by declaring that they shall not be abridged, or that
the former shall not be extended. If no line can be drawn, a declaration
in either form would amount to nothing. ' 54 Madison evidently meant
that in order for individual rights to be secure from governmental
invasion, it would be necessary for both the ninth and tenth amend-
ments to constrain the powers of the newly established central govern-
ment.55 The failure of either to do so would be inimical to the pres-
ervation of a zone of individual autonomy where governments could
not intrude.
Madison's view is supported by his correspondent, Hardin Bum-
ley. Burnley believed that "the supporters of the Bill of Rights in the
Virginia legislature deemed both the ninth and tenth amendments to
be essential in order to assure the efficacy of the previous amend-
ments." 56 Thus, as Wilmarth has concluded, "[t]he Burnley-Madison
letters confirm that the ninth and tenth amendments were intended to
operate in tandem to protect the unenumerated rights of the people
and the unenumerated powers of the states against federal encroach-
ment." 57 Wilmarth is not alone in this conclusion, for Raoul Berger,
Russell Caplan, Randy Barnett and Robert Bork all agree on this point,
though they disagree as to its meaning regarding the ninth amend-
ment.
58
54. Id. at 1190; 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 432 (G. Hunt ed. 1904) (letter
from Madison to George Washington, dated Dec. 5, 1789, discussing Randolph's objections).
To Professor McAffee, this statement is simply further proof that Madison intended the ninth
amendment to perform the single function of preventing implied constructive governmental
powers. McAffee, supra note 11, at 1287-93. McAffee fails to consider the possibility that
Madison thought the ninth amendment would perform this function while at the same time
perform an utterly separate function: preserve unenumerated rights as judicially enforceable
affirmative rights. The distinction drawn by Randolph-between the retention of unenumer-
ated rights as only a limitation on governmental power, on the one hand, and a mutually
exclusive alternative reading of unenumerated rights as a source of enforceable affirmative
rights, on the other hand-was "fanciful" to Madison because the ninth amendment was
intended to serve both functions. McAffee has fallen into the trap of supposing that Madison
was unable to conceive of but one role for the ninth amendment. However theoretically
messy such a dual role might be, it was politically adept to conceive of the ninth amendment
in such a fashion. Madison was a statesman, but he was also a politician. See also supra note
48.
55. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 15-16.
56. Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 1302 (emphasis in original).
57. Id.
58. See Berger, supra note 2, at 2-3 (ninth and tenth amendments are "two sides
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Further historical evidence of this parallel intent is found in the
congressional modification of the tenth amendment, to which the
phrase "or to the people" was added. 59 This phrase provides a linguistic
parallel between ninth amendment rights and tenth amendment pow-
ers. Without the change, the ninth amendment would have operated
to secure the unenumerated rights "retained by the people," while the
tenth amendment would have simply preserved the residual powers to
the states alone. By adding the phrase "or to the people" the tenth
amendment makes plain that the people, as ultimate sovereigns, retain
both unenumerated individual rights and the residual powers of gov-
ernment, which may or may not be vested by them in their state gov-
ernmental agents. Moreover, early constitutional commentators such
as Justice Joseph Story interpreted the phrase "or to the people" to
mean that "what is not conferred [to the national government], is with-
held, and belongs to the state authorities, if invested by their constitu-
tions of government respectively in them; and if not so invested, it is
retained by the people, as a part of their residuary sovereignty." 60 In
sum, both amendments were conceived as devices by which the sov-
ereign people manifested their residual sovereignty. By the ninth
amendment, they retained unenumerated rights; by the tenth amend-
ment, they retained the nondelegated and unprohibited powers.
But because the tenth amendment failed to limit federal powers
to those "expressly" delegated, it has borne out Randolph's prediction
that it would "not appear... to have any real effect.",61 Madison argued
that the federal government would not usurp state autonomy because
it would possess powers which were "few and defined" while the states
would retain powers that were "numerous and indefinite."'62 Thus, the
tenth amendment could easily have been read as stating a presumption
of the same coin"); Caplan, supra note 2, at 262-64 (ninth amendment preserves individual
rights as determined by state law, while the tenth amendment preserves state power to act
in areas not delegated to the national government or prohibited to the states); Barnett, supra
note 2, at 4-16 (ninth amendment, as well as tenth amendment, bars extension of federal
powers through unwarranted implication and limits the means of exercising such powers);
Bork Hearings, supra note 50, at 249 ("ninth amendment may be a direct counterpart to the
tenth amendment").
59. See I ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 48, at 790; 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 38, at 1118 (House of Representatives debates of Aug. 18, 1789). Though the debates
provide no certain reason for the change, the phrase was probably added to underscore the
theme that "ultimate authority ... resides in the people alone .. ." and that "[t]he federal
and state governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people." THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 27, at 294.
60. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
752 (1833) (emphasis added).
61. 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 1191 (letter from Edmund Randolph
to George Washington, dated Dec. 6, 1789). See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Trans.
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 45, supra note 29, at 292.
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in favor of state power, requiring the national government to sustain
the burden of proving that a contested power it seeks to exercise is
within the "enumerated objects" 63 of its jurisdiction. 64 But this inter-
pretation was rendered stillborn by McCulloch v. Maryland,65 in which
Chief Justice John Marshall found in the necessary and proper clause
broad authority for implied federal powers. In so doing, he dismissed
the tenth amendment as furnishing no independent limit on the powers
of the central government because, unlike the Articles of Confederation,
the tenth amendment omitted the word "expressly" before the phrase
"delegated to the United States." 66 The result, of course, is the modern
understanding that the tenth amendment "states but a truism that all
is retained which has not been surrendered. ' 67 The unspoken message
of the modern understanding is that the presumption of state power
has been inverted into a presumption of federal power. In that sense,
the "truism" of the tenth amendment serves purposes utterly the op-
posite of those for which it was adopted. Its intended function has been
eviscerated. Perhaps because of its linkage with the tenth amendment,
the ninth has suffered a similar desuetude.
Nevertheless, the inescapable conclusion remains that both
amendments were intended to preserve to the people of the states the
sovereign's prerogative to confer powers upon their state governmental
agents (recognized in the tenth amendment) and to create personal
liberties inviolate from governmental invasion (recognized in the ninth
amendment). The intended medium for doing so, in both cases, was
the state constitution. However, key differences do exist between the
two amendments. The ninth recognizes that federally unenumerated
personal liberties may not be treated any differently from federally
enumerated liberties. The tenth simply recognizes that the people of
the states and their state governmental agents retain residual authority
to act in the shade of federal powers. Thus, the ninth amendment
creates federal rights that are independent barriers to federal action,
while the tenth amendment recognizes the existence of concurrent state
powers beyond the frontier of federal power. This conclusion is dis-
puted by some commentators, who contend that the ninth amendment
is merely a truism and devoid of enforceable content. This view comes
in three variations; I believe each one is flawed.
63. THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 245 (Q. Madison) (W. Kendall & G. Cary eds. 1966)
(the central government's "jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves
to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects").
64. See, e.g., Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 1311-12, for another variation of this
idea.
65. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
66. Id. at 406-07.
67. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941).
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B. Flawed Visions of the Ninth Amendment
A common error among many ninth amendment commentators
is to conflate the distinct yet interrelated purposes of the ninth and
tenth amendments. An example of such conflation was provided by
Justice Stanley Reed who, writing for the Court in United Public Work-
ers v. Mitchell, asserted:
68
The powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Gov-
ernment are subtracted from the totality of sovereignty orig-
inally in the states and the people. Therefore, when objection
is made that the exercise of a federal power infringes upon
rights reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, the
inquiry must be directed toward the granted power under
which the action of the Union was taken. If granted power is
found, necessarily the objection of invasion of those rights,
reserved by the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, must fail.
69
In essence, Justice Reed argued that the rights and powers asso-
ciated with the amendments logically are complementary sides of the
same coin. As Randy Barnett has demonstrated, such a view is wrong
because it "construes the Ninth Amendment to mean nothing more
than what is stated in the Tenth."7 Further, it renders the ninth amend-
ment superfluous, 7 1 and, if correct, must also apply to constitutionally
enumerated rights, a position wildly at odds with how courts have
interpreted the constitutionally enumerated rights.7 2 In short,
"[c]onstruing the ninth amendment as a mere declaration of a consti-
tutional truism, devoid of enforceable content, renders its substance
nugatory and assigns to its framers an intention to engage in a purely
moot exercise."
73
Raoul Berger provides a second example of the flawed reasoning
attending interpretation of the ninth amendment. He contends that the
ninth amendment is merely declarative of an area in which government
has "no power."7 4 According to Berger, the government may not act
to invade unenumerated rights, but if it does so the judiciary has no
power to intervene. 75 Berger reaches this conclusion because he con-
ceives ninth amendment rights as arising outside the Constitution, and
68. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
69. Id. at 95-96.
70. Barnett, supra note 2, at 6.
71. Id. at 6-7.
72. Id. at 7.
73. Massey, supra note 2, at 316.
74. Berger, supra note 2, at 9. See also Dunbar, supra note 2, at 641.
75. Berger, supra note 2, at 9. See also Berger, supra note 50, at 966-73.
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he assigns to the framers an intent to make only the enumerated rights
judicially enforceable.76
Berger's view is wrong for several reasons. First, his evidence of
the framers' intentions is not persuasive. Berger relies on Madison's
statement on the floor of the House, during the first Congress, that if
the Bill of Rights were "incorporated into the Constitution, indepen-
dent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner
the guardians of those rights... they will naturally be led to resist every
encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for in the constitution
by the declaration of rights."77 From this Berger infers that Madison
meant to vest the judiciary with only a limited power to enforce "ef-
fectual provisions against encroachment on particular rights."7 8
While it is undeniable that Madison's remark indicates his belief
that the judiciary would enforce the enumerated rights, it does not
necessarily follow that Madison thought the judiciary disabled from
protecting the unenumerated rights. Indeed, there are two sound rea-
sons to conclude that Madison meant to impose no such limitation on
the judiciary. First, there is nothing definitive in Madison's remarks
or in the urgings of the Anti-Federalist proponents of the Bill of Rights
to suggest that the ninth amendment was anything other than a full-
fledged member of the Bill of Rights. Given its critical function of
preventing the possibility that judicial enforcers of the enumerated
rights might err by supposing that the enumerated rights were all of
the rights retained by the people, it is improbable that the framers meant
to assign to the ninth amendment a lesser importance than other parts
of the Bill of Rights. Second, the judicial failure to protect ninth amend-
ment rights would permit Congress to invade those rights freely, a
conclusion that mocks the textual command of the amendment that
unenumerated rights may not be denied or disparaged by the enumer-
ation of other rights. If only the enumerated rights are eligible for ju-
dicial protection, the unenumerated rights must necessarily atrophy.
"If this is not disparagement ... the concept has been drained of all
meaning."
7 9
Moreover, Berger's view relies on an unarticulated assumption
that ninth amendment rights are identical to tenth amendment powers.
Justice Reed at least identified this as the assumption upon which he
relied; Berger simply asks us to swallow this assumption in a flimsy
capsule misleadingly labeled "original intent."' 80 Finally, since Berger
76. Berger, supra note 2, at 9; Berger, supra note 50, at 970-71.
77. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 48, at 440 (James Madison's remarks of June
8, 1789) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 433 (James Madison's remarks of May 25, 1789) (emphasis added).
79. Massey, supra note 2, at 318.




admits that these rights exist, denying the judiciary the power to enforce
them does not make the problem go away. Rather, the task of locating
and enforcing them merely travels to governmental actors in some other
branch."' To justify his claim, Berger is required at a minimum to do
what he does not: defend the proposition that human liberty is better
served by vesting elected politicians, rather than judges, with custody
of unenumerated rights.
A third view of the ninth amendement is articulated by Russell
Caplan. Caplan contends that the amendment "simply provides that
the individual rights contained in state law are to continue in force
under the Constitution until modified or eliminated by state enactment,
by federal preemption, or by a judicial determination of unconstitu-
tionality."8 2 In essence, Caplan adds the following italicized text to the
ninth amendment:
The mere fact of enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people, but such retained rights may be denied
or disparaged by any other means or power given to the federal
government under this Constitution.
Thus, in Caplan's view, the supremacy clause 3 allows Congress,
whenever it chooses, to displace any unenumerated right with its sub-
stantive source in state law, just as Congress may act under the com-
merce clause, for example, to displace contrary state law.84 Caplan's
position is dubious for three reasons.
First, it assumes that the Anti-Federalists failed to realize that the
ninth amendment would not do what they demanded of it: preserve
individual rights rooted in state law against federal invasion. Given
the evident and overriding concern of the Anti-Federalists on this point,
it is highly unlikely that the Anti-Federalists would have acceded to an
amendment so ill-suited to their purpose. In essence, Caplan asks us
to conclude "that the best interpretation of the Bill of Rights [including
the ninth amendment] is based on the theory used by its most vocif-
erous [Federalist] opponents. 8 5
81. See Sager, You Can Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth, and Plead the
Fifth, But What on Earth Can You Do with the Ninth Amendment?, 64 CH.-]KENT L. Rv.
239, 252 (1988).
82. Caplan, supra note 2, at 228.
83. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of
any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
84. Caplan, supra note 2, at 228 (individual rights preserved by the ninth amend-
ment continue until "eliminated... by federal preemption").
85. Barnett, supra note 2, at 8.
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Second, Caplan's reading compels him to explain the amendment's
purpose. His analysis suggests that its function was to prevent the ar-
gument that simply by expressing certain rights as inviolate against
federal invasion, the Constitution had automatically extinguished all
other human rights, whatever their origin. This is an astonishing prop-
osition, one radically opposed to the structure of the Constitution and
the historical evidence of its creation, both of which support the con-
clusion that the central government was intended to be one of limited
and delegated powers. Moreover, this view ignores the contempora-
neous, if imperfect, intent of the tenth amendment to limit federal
powers. Apparently, Caplan would accept the idea that the tenth
amendment was an empty reminder of the federal government's limited
powers and that the ninth amendment was an even emptier statement
that the federal government had not yet displaced individual rights
under the state constitutions. To a limited extent, such a view of the
tenth amendment may be accurate, but to view the ninth amendment
in this fashion is to lose all sight of its Anti-Federalist origins. It is an
explanation that fails to account even for the "rights-powers" concep-
tion of the ninth amendment from which it is born.8 6
Third, Caplan's recasting of the ninth amendment reveals that,
like Berger and Justice Reed, he conflates the ninth and tenth amend-
ments. Caplan is unable to perceive that the ninth amendment, like
the first eight amendments, acts as an independent barrier to govern-
mental action since he assumes that its limits are merely definitional.
Like the tenth, Caplan's ninth amendment merely traces the frontier
of federal power otherwise drawn in the Philadelphia Convention. If
that was its intended function, there was no reason to add it to the
Constitution.
The ninth amendment's text, history and structural role in the
Constitution compel the conclusion that it establishes judicially en-
forceable federal constitutional rights with their substantive source in
state constitutions. Since the implications of this conclusion are so
dramatically at odds with the accepted understanding, it is imperative
that the constitutional landscape ,thus created be charted in some rea-
sonably complete fashion.
II. NINTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS SUBSTANTIVELY ROOTED IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONS: CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS, CONSEQUENCES
AND OBJECTIONS
The most radical implication of the view that the ninth amend-
ment contains within it judicially enforceable rights that are substan-
86. See supra note 11.
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tively rooted in the state constitutions is that such rights are prophy-
lactic of congressional action. This conclusion follows inexorably from
the textual directive that ninth amendment rights are to be treated on
a par with the other enumerated rights. Just as Congress may not use
its legislative power to establish a state religion,8 7 it may not use its
legislative power to trench upon ninth amendment rights. Since the
substance of those rights is to be found in state constitutions, the cit-
izens of a state, through the medium of their constitutions, possess the
apparent authority to disable Congress from limiting any rights the
states specify as worthy of constitutional protection. A number of dif-
ficulties exist with such a view. While some are daunting, none are
insuperable.
A. Ninth Amendment Rights-Static or Dynamic?
The first question posed is whether the "rights retained by the
people" are a set of rights antecedent to federal constitutionalization
and, thus, effectively frozen in time and content, or whether such rights
constitute a dynamic, evolving list that changes as sentiment shifts
within the states. Much can be said for the proposition that ninth
amendment rights are static. The word "retained" surely suggests that
these rights existed prior to the Constitution. One must remember,
however, that the ninth amendment was likely intended as a source of
both natural rights (which certainly predated any government) and
positive rights (those created by, or incidental to, the act of political
union).8 Thus, it is plausible that the term "retained" was meant to
apply only to those ninth amendment rights that were natural.8 9 Yet
from the perspective of 1791, all natural rights, as well as all rights
enumerated in state constitutions, would have predated federal con-
stitutional union. It is equally logical to suppose that both categories
of rights would be "retained" by the people. It is thus unconvincing in
both method and result to contend that the word "retained" was orig-
inally meant to apply only to natural rights.90
87. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S.
CONST. amend. I. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) ("The 'establishment
of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither the state nor the
Federal Government can set up a church").
88. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12 and Massey, supra note 2, at 312-23.
89. See Barnett, supra note 2, at 27 n.88 & accompanying text.
90. An egregious example of the aridity of this methodology of constitutional in-
terpretation may be seen by examining an episode in Canadian constitutional law. Section
24 of the Constitution Act of 1867 (formerly the British North America Act) provides that
"qualified Persons" may be appointed to the Senate. In 1928, the Supreme Court of Canada
unanimously concluded that the word "persons" did not include women because it was
unthinkable that the drafters of the 1867 Act could have meant for it to do so. No attempt
was made to search for any more contemporary meaning. See In the matter of a Reference
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Fortunately, there are other sources, more definitive than suppo-
sitions concerning original intent, that aid resolution of this issue. The
addition over time of new states both complicates and simplifies mat-
ters. A frozen conception of ninth amendment rights would deny cit-
izens of newly admitted states the most fundamental right apparently
preserved by the ninth amendment: the right to decide the limits of
governmental power to invade individual liberty and to make that
decision effective against the people's federal agents. Moreover, denying
this right to newly admitted states while conferring it upon the original
states through a frozen conception of ninth amendment rights would
violate the principle that each newly admitted state is admitted "on an
equal footing with the original States in all respects whatsoever," 9' a
principle followed since the beginning of the American union.
Finally, a static conception of ninth amendment rights would un-
dermine the principle that such rights are to be treated on a par with
the other rights enumerated in the Constitution. With the possible ex-
ception of the seventh amendment's right to a civil jury trial, no other
enumerated constitutional right is treated as frozen in time. Even the
seventh amendment right necessarily bends with the times, given the
necessity of fashioning analogues from 1791 practice to present-day
causes of action unknown two centuries ago.9 2
Given the inherent shortcomings of the static view of rights, a
dynamic conception holds more promise. The dynamic view, however,
as to the Meaning of the Word "Persons" in Section 24 of the British North America Act,
1867 [1928] S.C.R. 276. On appeal, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council reversed,
contending that the historicist method was inconclusive and would produce results redolent
"of days more barbarous than ours." Edwards v. Attorney-General for Canada [1930] App.
Cas. 124, 128. Instead, Lord Sankey declared Canada's basic constitutional document to be
"a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits." Id. at 136.
91. Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911), quoting from the act admitting
Tennessee into the Union in 1796.
92. Although "the thrust of the [Seventh] Amendment was to preserve the right to
jury trial as it existed in 1791," Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 198 (1974), the Court has
necessarily been required to determine whether "actions brought to enforce statutory rights
.. are analogous to common-law causes of action ordinarily decided in English law courts
in the late 18th century, as opposed to those customarily heard by courts of equity or ad-
miralty." Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 109 S. Ct. 2782, 2790 (1989). If analogous to the
former, the seventh amendment right attaches. But to reach the conclusion, the Court un-
dertakes the following inquiry: historical comparison of the determination of whether the
remedy sought is legal or equitable, and, if "these two factors indicate that a party is entitled
to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.... [deciding] whether Congress may assign
and has assigned resolution of the relevant claim to a non-Article III adjudicative body that
does not use a jury as factfinder." Id. (footnote omitted). Congress may do so with respect
to "public rights," which are not simply issues arising between the government and private
citizens, but may encompass private disputes that are "so closely integrated into a public
regulatory scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution .... Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agricultural Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also
Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455
(1977). The end result is that the parallels between 1791 and 1991 are not exact.
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requires us to confront the issue of whether federal ninth amendment
rights can ever be applied uniformly across the country. Further, it
raises the problem of whether such rights, once created by a state con-
stitution and thus federalized by the ninth amendment, may be altered
thereafter by unilateral action of the state polity.Uniformity of ninth amendment rights is probably not possible,
for it presents the courts with the truly Herculean task of stitching
together a common-and consistent-fabric of rights from fifty-one dif-
ferent sources. Because this is unlikely, ninth amendment decisional
law would develop a richly variegated pattern. Such a result is the
probable intention of the ninth amendment, part of the legacy of a
system of dual sovereignty, and in any case, a virtue. The citizens of
each state would be entitled to define their relationship with all of their
governmental agents. They would be able to do this both immediately
(with the state via the state constitution) and, within the other con-
straining limits of the federal constitution, mediately (with the national
government via the ninth amendment's incorporation of state consti-
tutional guarantees). It has not proven burdensome for the federal
courts to manage with fifty-one different legal regimes in diversity cases
under the rule of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.93 Thus, it is unlikely
to be much more difficult for the courts to rely on state constitutional
law to breathe life into this substantive dimension of the ninth amend-
ment.
Skeptics will observe that the natural consequence of viewing ninth
amendment rights as dynamic is that some Americans will enjoy more
individual liberty than others. They will. But all Americans will enjoy
the same package of federal constitutional rights that owe their sub-
stance to federal law. Only with respect to the ninth amendment will
federal constitutional rights vary with one's residence. Thus, for ex-
ample, if Californians believe privacy to be constitutionally desirable
and Michiganders do not, Michiganders can hardly complain if Con-
gress invades their personal privacy in a fashion the ninth amendment
would not permit with respect to Californians. To the extent the pack-
age of individual liberties provided by the federal Constitution and a
state constitution is insufficient, state citizens will respond by altering
their state constitutions or departing to other, more generous jurisdic-
tions. This objection is little different from the current situation where,
for example, Alaskans possess the right to smoke marijuana in their
homes while the citizens of every other state face fines or imprisonment
for the same conduct.
94
93. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94. Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494, 504, 511 (Alaska 1975). In November 1990,
however, Alaskans amended the Alaska statutes by a ballot initiative to impose criminal
penalties on the possession or use of marijuana in one's home. Since Ravin held that the
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Acceptance of the dynamic conception, however, poses another
problem. Once a state polity has created a right under its own consti-
tution, and thereby transmuted the right into a federal constitutional
guarantee via the ninth amendment, may that same state polity rescind
the federal ninth amendment right by rescinding the underlying state
right? Two other vexing issues relate to resolving this question: first,
are ninth amendment rights enforceable only against the federal gov-
ernment or also against the states that create their substantive content;
and second, are federal courts to acquire the power, in a case involving
a ninth amendment right, to review de novo a state supreme court's
legal conclusions as to the meaning of the state constitution?
The principle that helps to resolve all three issues is that, while
ninth amendment rights are federal, their substance is derived wholly
from state constitutional law. This is consistent with the animating
desire of the ninth amendment's proponents: to reserve to the people
their rights under local law, and to insulate those rights from federal
invasion. With these principles in mind, it seems appropriate for a state
polity to have within its own control the continued vitality of any given
state constitutional right.
States, as a matter of independent state constitutional law, may
alter their own constitutions. They may direct courts in their respective
jurisdictions to interpret independent state guarantees of individual
liberty no more generously than their federal courterparts.95 Under my
view of the ninth amendment, the states would also continue to control
the existence and substance of those ninth amendment rights that owe
their initial viability to state constitutional action. This is quite similar
to established Erie practice. In diversity cases, federal courts are re-
quired to follow the rule of law announced by the highest court of the
state whose law is applicable. 96 For this reason, and the fact that through
the "adequate and independent" state grounds doctrine97 states are free
privacy guarantee of the Alaska Constitution secured the right to possess and use marijuana
in one's home, the sanctions created by the initiative for this conduct would appear to be
unenforceable.
95. For example, Californians adopted Ballot Proposition 115 on June 5, 1990.
The measure amends the California Constitution to require that in criminal cases, most
relevant guarantees of the California Declaration of Rights shall be interpreted identically to
the appropriate analogue in the federal Bill of Rights.
The adequate and independent state grounds doctrine preserves the states' freedom to
chart state constitutional guarantees at variance from federal guarantees. See Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81 (1980)
(a state is free "to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive than
those conferred by the Federal Constitution").
96. See Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940); Six Co. v. Joint
Highway Dist. No. 13, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
When the state rule is uncertain, federal courts have greater flexibility in announcing what
they believe to be the state law. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456
(1967).
97. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
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to determine their own law, the law applicable in federal diversity cases
is generally of state origin.
The same result would be true in ninth amendment cases: the
asserted right, though federal, owes its entire substantive vitality to
state constitutional action. Through the adequate and independent state
grounds doctrine, the states remain free to establish and alter their
constitutional law. That such alteration would have a collateral impact
on a federal constitutional right is simply part of the ninth amendment's
design.98
Ninth amendment rights originating in state constitutions are dy-
namic organisms. Their dynamism is rendered less destabilizing than
it might otherwise be by the fact that such rights, while federal, operate
only as a barrier to federal and state governmental action with respect
to the state of origin. They are thus dynamic in substance but cramped
in geographic application.
B. Do Ninth Amendment Rights Based in State Constitutions Apply
Only to the Federal Government or Also to the State of Origin?
Most commentators agree that the ninth amendment operates, if
at all, only against federal action. 99 It is, of course, quite clear that the
framers and ratifiers of the Bill of Rights intended it to bind only the
actions of the federal government. Portions of the Bill of Rights control
the states only through the medium of selective incorporation inferred
in the fourteenth amendment's due process clause. The ninth amend-
ment has, of course, never been so incorporated; at least at this point
in our constitutional history, there is thought to be virtually nothing
to incorporate. 100 However, because ninth amendment rights originate
in and derive substance from state constitutional law they also apply
to the state of origin through the constitution of the state. Thus, there
98. Other aspects of the federal Constitution may limit a state's ability to alter or
remove certain guarantees of human liberty from the state constitution and the ninth amend-
ment. Former Justice Hans Linde has suggested that although the federal Constitution's
guarantee clause (U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4) is not justiciable in federal court (Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)), it may be justiciable in state courts. Further, it may operate to
prevent certain substantive alterations of state constitutions. See Linde, When is Initiative
Lawmaking not 'Republican Government'?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 159 (1989).
99. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 2, at 37; Berger, supra note 2, at 23-24; Caplan,
supra note 2, at 264. But see Redlich, supra note 2, at 807-08; Massey, supra note 2, at 309-
19, 322-31; Barnett, supra note 2, at 9-11, 14-22, 30-42. The ninth amendment has never
been expressly incorporated into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause and thus is
not currently applicable to the states through that familiar medium. Presumably the rule of
Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)-that the provisions of the Bill of Rights
limit only the powers of the federal government-currently applies to the ninth amendment.
100. Judge Bork, for example, regards the ninth amendment as analogous to "an
amendment that says 'Congress shall make no' and then there is an ink blot and you cannot
read the rest of it ...." Bork Hearings, supra note 50, at 249.
1250
The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment
is no need for the ninth amendment to act directly upon the state.
Indeed, limiting the ninth amendment to bar only federal action would
simplify matters. Unfortunately, it is a bit unrealistic to do so, for the
ninth amendment may also encompass a "natural law" dimension, and
the unenumerated rights developed in that strain have no necessary
foundation in state constitutions. For these "natural law" unenumer-
ated rights to be treated on a par with enumerated rights incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment's due process clause it may well be
necessary to enforce them against the states. It would be illogical to
develop a ninth amendment doctrine that applies only selectively
against the states but no more illogical than the selective incorporation
doctrine now attending the fourteenth amendment's due process clause.
Accordingly, I argue that, like most of the Bill of Rights, the ninth
amendment should apply to the states as well as the federal government.
Superficially, it would appear that Russell Caplan is correct when
he contends that it is not "logically possible to 'incorporate' the ninth
amendment through the fourteenth to apply as a prohibition against
the states, because the ninth amendment was designed not to circum-
scribe but to protect the enactments of the states."101 Caplan seeks to
reinforce his point by observing that, in its modern dimension, the
fourteenth amendment protects only unenumerated federal rights
against state action. Thus, the right of privacy, grounded in the sub-
stantive due process clause, and the closest analogue to an enforceable
ninth amendment right, owes its legal existence to a conclusion that it
is a federal right, not one grounded in state law.
10 2
There are two things wrong with this view. First, ninth amendment
rights are federal rights; they just owe their substance to another source
of law. Thus, "if one considers that the federal character of ninth
amendment... rights derives from state action, application of the ninth
amendment to the states would merely amount to a federally enforced
right to make the states abide by their own law."' 1 3 Surely, a require-
ment that a government abide by its own law is the essence of due
process. 0 14 Second, the United States Supreme Court has begun, per-
haps unwittingly, to do precisely that under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'r of Webster
101. Caplan, supra note 2, at 261-62 (footnote omitted).
102. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
103. Massey, supra note 2, at 327.
104. See Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 276 (1855) ("The words, 'due process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the
same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna Charta"); see also Corwin,




County1°5 a West Virginia county tax assessor assessed property on the
basis of its recent Purchase price, but made only minor modifications
to assessments of land not recently sold. As a result, the taxes imposed
on similar property were wildly disparate. The Supreme Court held
that this practice violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment because the West Virginia Constitution provided that "tax-
ation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property,
both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value ..... 106
While conceding that West Virginia was free to "divide different kinds
of property into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden
so long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable,"' 107 the Court
concluded that since the state's constitution had expressly directed
otherwise, the tax assessor violated Allegheny Pittsburgh's federal equal
protection rights. This is nothing more than a conclusion that West
Virginia must comply with its own law, and that a federal court may
compel a state actor to do so. While the Court used the rubric of federal
equal protection law for this purpose, it could just as easily have relied
on due process or, were it justiciable, the guarantee clause. 08
Although the Court made no mention of it, the result in Allegheny
Pittsburgh is at odds with Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Hald-
erman,10 9 which held that the eleventh amendment prohibited a federal
court from enjoining a state official from further violations of state law.
The holdings may be harmonized by observing that Allegheny Pitts-
burgh posed an issue of federal law, albeit one the substance of which
was supplied by a state constitution, while Pennhurst raised a claim of
pure state law, with no claimed federal medium to transmute the as-
serted state right into a federal guarantee.
Allegheny Pittsburgh suggests that the Court is prepared to accept
state sources of law as the substantive core of federal guarantees. There
is no theoretical or conceptual reason to suppose that this approach
must be confined to the equal protection clause. Indeed, with only
minimal adherence to the ninth amendment's text, historical context
and structural place within the constitutional plan, it is hard to find a
portion of the Constitution more suited to the job of federalizing state
constitutional guarantees of individual rights, rendering them imper-
vious to invasion by either the federal or state governments.
As might be expected there are problems with this view. For ex-
ample, suppose that a criminal defendant is prosecuted in state court
105. 109 S. Ct. 633 (1989).
106. W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (quoted in Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 635).
107. Allegheny Pittsburgh, 109 S. Ct. at 638.
108. See Note, The Rule of Law and the States: A New Interpretation of the Guarantee
Clause, 93 YALE L.J. 561 (1984); Massey, supra note 2, at 328-29.
109. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
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and evidence is introduced that the defendant contends was seized in
violation of the state constitution's version of the fourth amendment.
Both parties concede that the federal fourth amendment poses no bar-
rier to the admissibility of the evidence, so the issue is one purely of
state constitutional law. On appeal, the state supreme court concludes
that the evidence was properly admissible under the state constitution.
The luckless convict now files a habeas corpus petition in federal district
court, alleging that her federal ninth amendment rights were violated
by the introduction of the evidence. Does the federal district court have
the opportunity to revisit the same legal issue and decide it differently
from the state supreme court, on the ground that the issue is one of
federal constitutional law? I think not.
When this problem was introduced earlier l10 it was resolved by
noting that, while ninth amendment rights are federal, their substance
is wholly derived from state constitutional law. Given that these rights
would remain dormant but for a state polity's creation of them in its
state constitution, it seems consistent with both the structure of the
ninth amendment and the apparent intention of the ninth amendment's
Anti-Federalist proponents to defer to the states' decision on the sub-
stantive meaning of a ninth amendment right. Similarly, in an Erie
case, the federal courts would look to state law to supply the rule of
decision. The difference here, of course, is that it is a state rule that
drives the federal constitutional decision. That peculiarity is at the heart
of the interdependent and mutually equal federal scheme that the Anti-
Federalists envisioned in adopting the ninth amendment.
Moreover, such a result reinforces the earlier conclusion that state
polities should retain the power to alter state constitutional rights and,
thereby, alter the substance of federal ninth amendment rights. If ninth
amendment rights were of a "ratchet" type-once created by state con-
stitutional action they could never be reclaimed from the federal Con-
stitution-it would be necessary to concede to federal courts the power
to review such rights de novo. Such rights would have acquired a pe-
culiar federal status, wholly disembodied from their state origins. This
seems at odds with the intended nature of ninth amendment rights
grounded in state constitutions and would inspire unnecessary conflict
between the states and the federal government.
Finally, the principle of comity between the states and the federal
government suggests, if not compels, deference to state authority. The
United States Supreme Court continues, even after Garcia v. San An-
tonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,1 lto conduct a "judicial patrol
of the frontier between federal and state sovereignty""1 2 with respect
110. See supra text following note 93.
111. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
112. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 61, 75 (1989).
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to the exercise of federal judicial power under article III of the Con-
stitution." 3 The principles employed by the Court to check federal
judicial power-abstention, independent and adequate state grounds,
the Erie doctrine, exhaustion of state administrative remedies, to name
just a few-are better thought of as "tenth amendment guarantees, or
... rooted in tenth amendment principles of residual sovereignty, rather
than seemingly unconnected and disparate doctrines .... , 14 Thus, as
discussed, the tenth amendment operates to reinforce the original vi-
sion of the ninth amendment. The amendments were intended to work
in tandem to preserve individual rights secured through state action
and the power of states to act. In this instance, both amendments could
operate as designed: to use the states, rather than the federal govern-
ment, as structural bulwarks of human liberty." 5
C. The Relationship between the Ninth Amendment and the
Supremacy Clause
One might argue that this view of the ninth amendment violates
the supremacy clause. One reason it does not is simply because the
ninth amendment incorporates into the federal Constitution state con-
stitutional rights and secures them against federal invasion in the same
way that the Constitution protects other federal constitutional rights.
Just as the first amendment prevents Congress from mandating reli-
gious orthodoxy, the ninth amendment bars Congress from intruding
upon the constitutionally secured right of privacy of an Alaskan or
Californian. It is true, however, that this theory would create the pos-
sibility of conflicts between two federal constitutional rights, one based
in state law and the other in federal law.
This is a serious problem; such a view of the ninth amendment
cannot survive without some mechanism to resolve the inevitable in-
consistencies arising between rights enumerated in the federal Consti-
tution and rights unenumerated yet still extant in state constitutions.
A number of examples illustrate the scope of this problem. First, sup-
113. Id.
114. Id. at 74.
115. There is another way in which the two amendments reinforce one another. The
adequate and independent state grounds doctrine has generally been thought to be consti-
tutionally compelled since Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874). That con-
clusion is certainly not explicit in Murdock. Rather, Murdock is a case that merely raises
doubts about the power of Congress to enable the federal courts to review and decide issues
of state law independent of the state courts. Id. at 626, 633. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 380 (2d. ed. 1988) (Murdock has a "constitutional resonance" that
prevents Congress from authorizing the Supreme Court to review pure state law issues). My
view of the ninth amendment validates Murdock and suggests that the ninth and tenth
amendments, operating together, require the existence of the independent and adequate state
grounds doctrine.
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pose that a state constitution provides that fetuses are persons and
enjoy all the constitutional rights provided other persons. Let us also
assume that Roe v. Wade'1 6 is still good law. This situation creates a
plain conflict between the ninth amendment rights of the fetus and the
fourteenth amendment substantive due process rights of the pregnant
woman. Which prevails? This is an example of a pure constitutional
conflict; Congress has not attempted to preempt the state constitutional
right in any fashion.
Second, suppose the people of a state attempt to secure in their
constitution an individual right to practice private racial discrimina-
tion. In response, Congress exercises its power under section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment to prohibit the states from enforcing such a
right. Shall the fourteenth or the ninth amendment prevail? This con-
stitutes what would normally be a simple instance of preemption. In
light of the theory of ninth amendment rights advanced here, however,
such a conclusion would be unavailable.
Resolution of the first hypothetical, that of a purely constitutional
nature, involves an unavoidable conflict. However, if one right must
yield, the supremacy clause appears to dictate that the right with its
substantive source in federal law should prevail. Thus, if a state's con-
stitution guaranteed a woman's right to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy and if the United States Supreme Court were to, hypothetically,
reverse Roe and conclude that fetuses are persons, the federally created
rights of the fetus would prevail. Such is the inevitable consequence of
obedience to the supremacy of federally created rights and obligations.
Resolution of the second illustration, that involving racial dis-
crimination, is more difficult. Preliminarily, there are several answers.
First, the text and history of the fourteenth amendment reveal a clear
intention to displace contrary state laws. Thus, it is consistent to resolve
this textual conflict between competing federal rights by preferring the
right with its substantive source in federal law. As in the case of the
purely constitutional conflict, the structural role of the supremacy
clause bolsters this resolution. Moreover, because a major purpose be-
hind the ninth amendment was to insulate individual liberty from gov-
ernmental intrusion, the operative rule, in instances of conflict, must
be the one that pays most deference to the individual challenged by
governmental authority or that which maximizes individual liberty.
To better understand the role of the supremacy clause in the ad-
judication of ninth amendment rights, consider another hypothetical-
one that eliminates the fourteenth amendment as part of any solution.
Suppose that the New York Constitution establishes the right to buy
and sell securities traded on national securities markets while in pos-
116. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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session of material inside information obtained in the performance of
a fiduciary obligation of trust to the corporate issuer of the securities.
Does the ninth amendment trump section 10b of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934117 and Rule lOb-5,1"8 which clearly prohibit such
practices? If so, then states will freely evade and obviate congressional
authority, precluding needed uniform national policies regarding fi-
nancial markets. 1 9
There are two reasons why such a result would be inconsistent
with the intended purpose of the ninth amendment. First, a broad
purpose of the ninth amendment was to strike a balance between federal
power and the individual liberties of citizens whom that power could
affect. It was not an attempt to override the original Constitution which
was intended, in part, to create a national marketplace and end state
trade practices of preference and exclusion. Since the hypothetical New
York constitutional provision would effectively balkanize national eco-
nomic life, it is not within the intended purposes of the ninth amend-
ment.
Second, the hypothetical right posed is one with no plausible con-
nection to fundamental individual liberty. It would be necessary to
separate judicially-created state constitutional rights that preserve fun-
damental human liberty against governmental invasion from those
rights that seek only to preserve structural arrangements of the state
government or to mediate between individuals. Some judicial good
sense would be necessary to sort the "liberty-bearing norms" from the
purely administrative ones.' 20 Thus, it is clear that courts need a test
that will enable them to identify these "liberty-bearing norms." In the
best (or perhaps worst) tradition of the "formulaic" Constitution,' 2' I
propose a three-part test to accomplish this task.
III. A PROPOSED TEST
If the ninth amendment were interpreted in the "pure" Anti-Fed-
eralist fashion I have described, it would permit the states to frustrate
national policies squarely within the legitimate powers of the national
government. The proper structural function of the ninth amendment,
however, is to permit the people, through their state governments, to
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1990).
119. I make no contention that state statutes are in any way insulated from federal
preemption by virtue of the ninth amendment.
120. For instance, there is a world of difference between a right to cumulative voting
in corporate shareholder elections and a right to be free of mandatory governmental drug
testing without probable cause.
121. See generally Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165 (1985).
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limit the ability of any government-state or federal-to invade the
individual rights the sovereign people deem precious. This inherent
paradox requires some device to enable the judiciary to enforce ninth
amendment rights that promote the latter function while denying rec-
ognition to those purported ninth amendment rights that serve the
former function.
It is also important to state precisely what this test is designed to
accomplish. It is only part of a larger inquiry. As outlined earlier, the
ninth amendment can be read as stating a presumption that the rights
contained in state constitutions are federal constitutional rights retained
through the ninth amendment. This presumption, however, can be
overcome by a showing that the substance of the state constitutional
right asserted as a ninth amendment right is in conflict with other parts
of the federal Constitution. A form of constitutional preemption would
operate conclusively to rebut the asserted ninth amendment right. So,
as an extreme example, should a state include in its constitution a
provision guaranteeing the right of its citizens to "own" people as
slaves, the attempt to assert such a "right" as a ninth amendment right
would be an absurdity, given the preemptive effect of the thirteenth
amendment. It is only when the asserted ninth amendment right is not
preempted by the federal Constitution or federal constitutional case
law that the proposed test would operate. It is, to repeat, a test designed
to sift the wheat-fundamental "liberty-bearing" rights-from the chaff.
The desirability of permitting the people, through their state con-
stitutions, to define their fundamental liberties suggests that at least
one criterion for any test is that the proposed right qualify as "fun-
damental." Moreover, because the ninth amendment's structural role
in the Constitution seems to be to preserve fundamental individual
rights free of governmental invasion, any test should limit ninth amend-
ment rights to those that preclude governmental action. However, the
creation of new rights can reduce the stock of rights held by other
people. For example, if the right to speak freely includes the right to
hurl racial insults, there is a corresponding reduction in another's
claimed right to be free of racial harrassment. For this reason, it is
important to limit putative ninth amendment rights to those that do
not significantly impair other existing and recognized fundamental
rights. Finally, in order to control the possible abuse of state consti-
tutions as devices to frustrate legitimate national policies, it would be
necessary to refuse to recognize claimed ninth amendment rights that
are, in essence, attempts by a state to capture some perceived benefit
for its citizens while leaving the cost of providing the benefit to be
borne by out-of-staters. With these objectives in mind, the following
test is offered.
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A. Does the Asserted Ninth Amendment Right Preserve a
Fundamental Individual Liberty against Governmental Invasion?
The problem of identifying fundamental rights in a principled fash-
ion has plagued constitutional law for some time.122 This has not,
however, restrained the Court from vigorous attempts to formulate
diverse criteria for locating such rights. Justice Stone sought to justify
"exacting judicial scrutiny" with respect to "legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation," specifically including statutes "di-
rected . .. against discrete and insular minorities ... " 1,23 Justice Car-
dozo tried to limit fundamental rights to those "implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty." 124 Justice Douglas argued that fundamental rights
may be found in the "penumbras, formed by emanations from... [the]
guarantees [in the Bill of Rights] that help give them life and sub-
stance."' 25 Justice Powell contended that such rights could be limited
to those "explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the [federal]
Constitution"' 26 but could not be determined by the "relative societal
significance" of the asserted right.' 27 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Scalia now advocate reliance on history, in the form of the "most
specific tradition available."1 28 By contrast, the second Justice Harlan
stated that the proper historical inquiry relevant to locating funda-
mental rights is one that seeks more generally to determine "what his-
tory teaches are the traditions from which [our constitutional princi-
ples] developed as well as the traditions from which it broke. That
tradition is a living thing."' 29 To Harlan, unlike Rehnquist and Scalia,
history is a moving picture, not a snapshot frozen in time.
While some have criticized as essentially standardless judicial at-
122. It is arguable that this problem dates back to the origins of American constiu-
tional law. In Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 246 (1798), justices Chase and Iredell engaged
in their now famous debate over the role of natural law in constitutional interpretation. Chase
contended that "[a]n act of the legislature (for I cannnot call it a law) contrary to the great
first principles of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative
authority." Id. at 271, 3 DalI. at 271. By contrast, Iredell protested that the Court lacked
authority to invalidate legislation "merely because it is, in their judgment, contrary to the
principles of natural justice." Id. at 282. Prefigured in this is the modern debate over the
legitimacy of rights wholly implied from the Constitution. Compare Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), with Robert Bork's condemnation
of Griswold as "an unprincipled decision, both in the way in which it derives a new consti-
tutional right and the way in which it defines the right or, rather, fails to define it." Bork,
Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971).
123. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
124. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
125. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (1965).
126. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
127. Id.
128. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6 (1989).
129. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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tempts to locate fundamental rights, 130 and even defenders of the quest
admit it to be an exercise fraught with indeterminacy,' 31 the courts
have persisted in operating in this milieu because of a sense of the
purposes the American democratic experiment was designed to accom-
plish. Philip Bobbitt describes this endeavor as "the character, or ethos,
of the American polity' 132 and devotes a substantial portion of his
book Constitutional Fate to discussion of this ethical mode of consti-
tutional interpretation. 133 To Bobbitt, the enumerated rights in the "Bill
of Rights ... [act] to give us a constitutional motif, a cadence for our
rights, so that once heard we can supply the rest on our own."'
134
While that may be so, we must not lose sight of the constitutional
guidance provided by the ninth amendment: rights that derive their
substance from sources located outside the federal Constitution must
be given deference equal to that given constitutionally enumerated
rights. Accordingly, it would subvert the ninth amendment and render
it meaningless to limit such rights to those "explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the [federal] Constitution."' 35 The purpose of. asking
whether a ninth amendment right grounded in a state constitution is
"fundamental" is to ensure that we recognize only those rights that are
compatible with the ethos of our nation. No such salutary purpose
would be served were rights recognized that are inimical to either rights
inherent in national citizenship or to the legitimate functioning of na-
tional policy.
In pursuing this inquiry we could usefully employ the various
devices extant for locating fundamental rights, but in the context of
ninth amendment rights they should not be dispositive. Randy Barnett
has argued that "the Ninth Amendment can be viewed as establishing
a general constitutional presumption in favor of individual liberty." 1
36
If such a presumption were observed, the tests currently employed,
such as reliance upon history and tradition, would provide evidence
bearing upon rebuttal of the presumption, rather than dispositive in
and of themselves. Similar to the enumerated rights, governmental
intrusion upon otherwise lawful individual conduct would be presumed
130. See R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 261-65 (1990).
131. See, e.g., S. LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 191 (1988) ("[t]here is nothing
that is unsayable in the language of the Constitution"); M. PERRY, MORALITY, POLITICS,
AND LAW 149 (1988) ("the fundamental aspirations signified by the Constitution ... are
highly indeterminate"); Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contra-
dictions of Normative Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1065 (1981) ("the controversy of the
legitimacy of judicial review ... [to locate fundamental rights] is essentially incoherent and
unresolvable... [since] no defensible criteria exist.., to assess theories of judicial review").
132. P. BOBHITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 94 (1982) (emphasis in original).
133. Id. at 93-242.
134. Id. at 177.
135. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
136. Barnett, supra note 2, at 35 (footnote omitted).
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invalid unless found justified by a neutral magistrate. Barnett would
place the burden of justification on the government, m3 7 for as Stephen
Macedo has noted, the Constitution established islands of governmen-
tal powers "surrounded by a sea of individual rights," not "islands [of
individual rights] surrounded by a sea of governmental powers." 3 '
The ninth amendment is a critical link in preventing the sea of indi-
vidual rights from being drained by the engineers of governmental
power.
Application of this test to the foregoing hypotheticals is reasonably
straightforward. Few would seriously contend that securities trading
based on inside information entrusted for corporate purposes is a fun-
damental right.' 39 It is hard to imagine this right as one implicit in
ordered liberty, essential to a free people. I° Moreover, neither is such
a practice part of "the most specific tradition available."" 4 1 Similarly,
if tradition is viewed as an evolving organism, the vector of our tra-
ditions suggests that we have repeatedly sought to limit commercial
practices that injure society. Nor can this right be thought of as a right
implicit in, or even emanating from, other enumerated rights.' 42
The second illustration-the assertion of a right to practice private
racial discrimination-has slightly more to commend it, but not enough.
In an abstract sense, this nation certainly has a history and tradition
of immunizing private choice, however odious, from governmental
control. Even brief scrutiny of the "traditions from which we broke,"
however, would condemn an asserted right to practice private racial
discrimination. Nor could this right be thought of as one linked in
some implicit manner to enumerated rights. To the contrary, it is a
right that has its legitimacy called into question by the existence of
other enumerated rights plainly hostile in spirit to it.
Paradoxically, the easiest question is posed by a state constitu-
tional right securing to a fetus a right to be born, or to a woman the
right to terminate an unwanted pregancy. In the absence of a contrary
federal constitutional right-necessarily controlling because of the su-
premacy clause' 43-it would seem that the state-created right would be
presumed fundamental. A provision securing a woman's choice to end
137. Id. at 37.
138. S. MACEDO, THE NEw RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 27 (1986).
139. But see H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (ques-
tioning the economic wisdom of prohibiting insider trading); Carlton & Fischel, The Regu-
lation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857, 858, 866-68 (1983) (asserting that capital
markets might be more efficient in equating price with real value if insider trading were
permitted). To do justice to the authors, i doubt that any of them would assert that inside
trading, however beneficial economically, is a fundamental right.
140. Supra note 127.
141. Supra note 128.
142. Supra note 129.
143. See supra text following note 115.
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a pregnancy is one squarely within the idea of disabling governments
from preventing individuals from exercising lawful private choices.
Such a provision, moreover, is consonant with the direction in which
our traditions have moved. Indeed, there is in the common law a
reasonably specific tradition protecting against governmental penalty
abortions obtained prior to fetal viability.144 A provision securing a
fetal right to be born, at least regarding governmental attempts to deny
the right, seems implicit in any concept of ordered liberty, to say noth-
ing of the possibility that the right could be implied in the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law. It is with respect to the second prong
of the test that this right might encounter difficulty.
B. Does the Asserted Ninth Amendment Right Preserve Fundamental
Individual Liberties Without Significant Invasion of Other .
Fundamental Individual Liberties?
Our constitutional tradition increasingly asks us to balance as-
serted rights. For example, is free speech, at bottom, more important
than a rape victim's privacy 145 or society's interest in protecting chil-
dren from exploitation in child pornography?14 6 Is protection from the
harm inflicted by racist speech more important than free speech? 147 Is
144. See, e.g., 3 E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *50; 1 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES *129-30 (abortion prior to quickening-recognizable fetal move-
ment-was not a common law crime). See also authorities collected in Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 135 n.26 (1973).
145. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989).
146. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); cf Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691
(1990).
147. In recent years, a number of public and private educational institutions have
begun to promulgate policies seeking to strike a constitutional balance between the rights of
"hate speakers" under the first amendment and the rights of ethnic groups to pursue education
free of racial harasshent. See, for example, Stanford University's policy on racist speech,
which subjects such speech to disciplinary action whenever it "is intended to insult or stig-
matize an individual or a small group of individuals"; "is addressed directly to the individual
or individuals whom it insults or stigmatizes"; and "makes use of insulting or 'fighting'
words," defined as words "which are commonly understood to convey direct and visceral
contempt for human beings .... Stanford University Fundamental Standard Interpretation:
Free Expression and Discriminatory Harassment, June 1990. The University of Michigan's
policy was invalidated in Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989),
on grounds of overbreadth and vagueness. At least one chapter of the American Civil Liberties
Union (Northern California) has adopted a similar statement of policy, which would permit
racist speech on college campuses to be prohibited only when it "is specifically intended to
and does harass an individual"; "is addressed directly to the individual or individuals to
whom it harasses"; and "creates a hostile and intimidating environment which the speaker
reasonably knows or should know will seriously and directly impede the educational oppor-
tunities of the individual or individuals to whom it is directly addressed ... is enforced in
a manner consistent with due process protections.., contains specific illustrations.., which
demonstrate when the policy does or does not apply, is proportionate to the gravity of the
offense, and does not impose prior restraint upon expression." ACLU-NC Policy Concerning
Racist and other Group-Based Harassment on College Campuses, approved March 8, 1990.
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the state's interest in eradicating racial discrimination sufficiently com-
pelling to justify imposing a racial quota in the allocation of contracts
or licenses?
148
As rights expand they conflict more frequently. This tendency is
exacerbated as we begin to conceive of rights as collective rather than
individual entitlements. Thus, the collective right of an ethnic group to
be protected from racial epithets is arrayed against the individual claim
of a racist to speak freely. Because the collective right asserted in this
example is only enforceable against governmental action, the coherence
of the state action doctrine has traditionally served as a mediating
device, permitting courts to avoid resolution of this clash as a consti-
tutional matter. The state action doctrine, however, has partially broken
down, 14 9 and legislatures have sought to protect collective rights by
statute, thus forcing the courts to confront these competing claims of
entitlement. Increasingly, the judicial task includes the responsibility
of weighing rights against one another. This portion of the proposed
test is but another aspect of that role.
To discharge this aspect of the test, the courts would be required
to assess the "fundamental" status of the right being infringed by a
claimed ninth amendment right. If deemed fundamental, it would be
necessary to determine the degree of infringement. Only if the infringe-
The academic literature on the subject is burgeoning. See, e.g., Lawrence, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320 (1989);
Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L. J. 484.
148. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989); Metro Broadcasting
v. FCC, 110 S. Ct. 2997 (1990).
149. Compare, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (privately-owned com-
pany town prohibited from invoking state trespass laws to keep the streets free of religious
proselytizers) with Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (privately-owned
utility, granted a monopoly by state regulation and subject to other state-imposed regulatory
controls, held to be free to terminate service to customers without affording them the guar-
antees required by procedural due process). The Court has employed a variety of tests to
justify the distinctions it draws, focusing variously upon the nexus between the public and
private sector; see, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715 (1961), or, for
whether public functions have been delegated to private actors, see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S.
461 (1953). However, these tests do not establish a unitary doctrine from which predictable
answers may be drawn. Indeed, the Court admitted as much when it observed that "for-
mulating an infallible test [for state action] is an impossible task." Reitman v. Mulkey, 387
U.S. 369, 378 (1967). For a sampler of academic criticism of the state action doctrine, see
Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985); Thompson, Piercing
the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application to Self-Help
Repossession, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 1 (arguing that state action doctrine is incoherent); Tushnet,
Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1988) (contending that
a state action doctrine does not exist apart from the substantive law); Black, The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: 'State Action,'Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14, at 81 HARe. L. REV. 69, 95 (1967) (state action cases are "a conceptual disaster area");
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688-1720 (2d ed. 1988) (state action cases create
an "anti-doctrine," defining areas of civic life that the Constitution does not control).
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ment were substantial should the putative ninth amendment right be
denied recognition, since it will be recalled that this test operates only
when the source of the right in collision with the ninth amendment
right is also located outside of the federal Constitution. If the source
of the right were congressional legislation, there would be no particular
reason to prefer Congress' judgment to that of the states, especially
since the ninth amendment can be read to express an original preference
for the state decision.
Thus, a state constitutional provision that seeks to guarantee its
citizens the right to practice private racial discrimination is in conflict
with federal constitutional law since it amounts to a state practice that
coerces or encourages private racial discrimination. 50 This proposed
test need not be invoked at all to invalidate the provision. By contrast,
a state constitutional right to privacy interpreted to prohibit drug- test-
ing of job applicants by private employers 15' is surely not sufficiently
invasive of an employer's hypothetically fundamental right to select its
workforce freely so as to cause the privacy right to be denied ninth
amendment protection.
C. Does the Asserted Ninth Amendment Right Operate in a Fashion
That Does Not Unreasonably Export the Social Costs of the Right?
The federalist nature of ninth amendment rights requires that some
test be used to prevent the kind of economic or social balkanization
that the original Constitution was designed to prevent. 52 The problem
is a pervasive one, and stems from each political jurisdiction in a polity
seeking to better itself at the expense of its neighbors. Small units of
government Will be tempted to adopt policies that produce benefits for
their constituents paid for by residents of other jurisdictions. Similarly,
large-scale units of government will be susceptible to factional alliances
arranged to capture the machinery of government and deliver benefits
to the faction's members, the costs of which will be borne by citizens
not affiliated with the dominant faction. Moreover, small units of gov-
ernment will not incur some costs, like national defense, because the
benefit of the burdens is dissipated over the entire polity to such an
extent that it makes little economic sense for a single jurisdiction to
incur all costs involved. Thus, there is clearly reason to tinker with the
jurisdictional authority of political units in order to make the bound-
150. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967); cf Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
151. Luck v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 218 Cal. App. 3d 1, 267 Cal. Rptr. 618
(1989), petition for review denied, 1990 Cal. LEXIS 2391 (May 31, 1990).




aries of such authority congruent with the full costs and benefits of the
decisions made by the political unit. Dissonance results in externalities,
and politicians shrewdly exploit these opportunities to capture "free"
benefits by imposing costs on others. It is a form of political arbitrage
which, unlike economic arbitrage, serves less-to achieve market equi-
librium than to distort and pervert both allocations of public resources
and the democratic process itself.
Borrowing from dormant commerce clause jurisprudence, it is pos-
sible to address this issue by a series of inquiries. First, is the right at
issue one that is facially designed to capture benefits for local residents
at the expense of outsiders? If so, it must fail. A state constitutional
right preserving New Jersey lands for New Jersey waste would certainly
not meet this test.' 5 3 Second, does the right, though facially neutral,
impose a disproportionate share of costs on outsiders and vest a dis-
proportionate share of benefits with insiders? This right, too, must fail.
Thus, were Arizona to make it a matter of constitutional right to have
trains of no longer than seventy freight cars traverse the state, it would
likely fail as a ninth amendment right on this ground as well as for
failure to demonstrate the fundamental nature of the right involved. 
5 4
To make the point more concrete, suppose that Nevada's consti-
tution secures the right of its citizens to possess and view child por-
nography in the privacy of their homes. Assume that Congress, how-
ever, has used its commerce power to prohibit the interstate movement
of such materials and has also prohibited the production of child por-
nography. A Nevadan is then prosecuted in federal court because he
accepted shipment by mail of child pornography which all parties con-
cede he intended to view and possess solely within his own home. The
Nevadan contends that the prosecution is barred by the ninth amend-
ment, even though this right is not part of his federally protected due
process privacy rights. 55
Assuming that Nevada has a statute that bars Nevadans from
producing child pornography within Nevada, the asserted right, while
facially neutral, certainly seems to impose the social costs of the pro-
tected liberty on non-Nevadans. As a result, it does not acquire ninth
amendment status. But what if Nevada has no such statute? The prob-
lem, at least under the third prong of the proposed test, becomes much
tougher. The decision must ultimately rest on an empirical assessment
of the in-state and out-of-state impact of the social costs of producing
child pornography. Courts will necessarily be forced to rely, to some
degree, on social scientific (but not exclusively economic) studies to
153. Cf City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
154. Cf Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
155. See Osborne v. Ohio, 110 S. Ct. 1691 (1990) (court concludes that a state may
constitutionally proscribe the possession and viewing of child pornography).
1264
The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment
assess this empirical impact. 156 While it is arguable that these problems
have not been handled adeptly in the dormant commerce clause area,15 7
they have been handled without evident injury to the federal system.
Thus, the ninth amendment right does not seriously impede the
values of the federal system sought to be preserved by the supremacy
clause. Nor does it vitiate the substance of ninth amendment rights
rooted in state constitutions. My suggested resolution may appear to
"disparage" unenumerated rights when placed in conflict with enum-
erated rights or important values of federal union. This is necessitated
by the delicate balance of interests demanded of a truly dual, co-equal
partnership in a federal system. Courts can reasonably be asked to make
the delicate judgments this test requires. The interstices and intersec-
tions of federal and state power require sensitive judgment and a keen
appreciation of the value of federalism to human liberty will help courts
with the job. Without judicial attention, the framework of federalism
will rust and eventually collapse. The ninth amendment is a textual
reminder to do the necessary maintenance to avoid this disaster. How-
ever difficult these judgments may prove to be, this inquiry is preferable
to the alternative: the total disavowal of unenumerated rights, with the
attendant consequence that Congress will freely continue to ignore state
barriers to the imposition of its authority upon the liberty of individ-
uals.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ninth amendment is part of the Anti-Federalist constitution.
As such, it is an important device to preserve the structural value of
federalism. Deeply embedded in the amendment are two ideas. First,
to paraphrase Stephen Macedo, government powers are islands in a
sea of individual rights, not the sea encompassing islands of enumerated
liberties. Second, citizens in our federal system remain free to articulate,
through their autonomous state governments, the values of human
156. For a discussion of some of the problems encountered when incorporating
social science into judicial decisionmaking, see Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing
the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
For a discussion of these issues in the narrower area of constitutional adjudication, see
Faigman, Normative Constitutional Fact Finding: Exploring the Empirical Component of
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. (1991) (forthcoming).
157. See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 95 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Justice Scalia criticizes the aspect of dormant commerce clause jurisprudence
that requires courts to assess "whether the burden on commerce imposed by a state statute
is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Id. He prefers the approach
advocated by Donald Regan, who argues that the Supreme Court should invalidate, on
dormant commerce clause grounds, only those state laws that "discriminate against out-of-
state interests." Id. See Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense
of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091 (1986).
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liberty they particularly cherish. The Anti-Federalist legacy is the long-
forgotten point that those norms, selected by the citizens of the states,
also bind their federal governmental agents.
Because our system was intended to be one of dual sovereignty,
one important function of the ninth amendment is to preserve the
delicate balance between state autonomy and national uniformity. Of
course, use of the ninth amendment in the fashion advocated here will
create some friction at the margins; such a condition is probably always
present in federal systems. But that friction can be alleviated by a
judiciary that understands the importance of federalism to the pres-
ervation of human liberty. The ninth amendment stands as a (now)
silent reproach to those who urge the abandonment of judicial efforts
to police the frontier between federal power and state-guaranteed
rights.
1 58
There are, no doubt, many criticisms that may be leveled at the
radical and perhaps unsettling approach forwarded here. I hope to see
them emerge, for it is my purpose to provoke thought and stimulate
discussion. Perhaps in that interchange the ninth amendment will re-
gain some of the vitality that was imagined for it by those earlier Amer-
icans who so profoundly mistrusted national power. The ninth amend-
ment has languished in desuetude for its entire history. It is time to
dust off this Anti-Federalist relic, put it to use, and recognize that the
Constitution truly created a union-of Federalists as well as Anti-Fed-
eralists-intended to foster diverse choices concerning the relationship
between individuals and their governmental agents. Let us hope that
we have not so abandoned this view of the ninth amendment that today
we may not fruitfully mine this fertile constitutional bulwark of human
liberty, two centuries after its origin.
158. See South Carolina v. Baker, 108 S. Ct. 1355 (1988); Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See also J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS (1980) (advocating that the Court abandon the effort of pol-
icing the limits of federal power, leaving such issues to the political process).
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